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REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: 
THE CLASSICAL MODEL 
FERNANDO L. CANALE 
Andrews University 
The ground and methodology on which a new approach to the 
doctrine of revelation and inspiration can be developed have already 
been explored.' The question now before us is whether a new 
theoretical interpretation of the epistemological origin of Scripture is 
necessary.* Would not it be more practical and effective to choose one 
of the many available  interpretation^?^ In order to answer the question 
'Fernando Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New 
Approach," A USS 3 1 (1993): 91-104; id., "Revelaxion and Inspiration: Method for a New 
Approach," AUSS 31 (1993): 171-194. 
ZDissatisfaction with available interpretations has been present among theologians, 
part;cularly during the last three centuries. For instance, William J. Abraham states that 
"it is no exaggeration to  claim that contemporary Evangelid theology faces a crisis as 
regards its doctrine of inspiration. For some time it has been felt that its account has been 
inadequatev ( B e  Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture mew York: Oxford University 
Press, 19811, 1). He faces the evangelical crisis of understanding the origin of Scripture by 
developing what he calls a "genuine alternative" that is "intellectually viable and 
religiously valuablen (109; see also 9, 58-75). Still within the general parameters of the 
evangelical tradition (7, 109-118), Abraham's attempts to make room for a 
consistent application of the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation, which he 
considers "well established as an academic discipline and too relevant to our recovery of 
the past to be ignored or rejected" (5). The approach that I suggest calls for the 
construction of a new model from the very foundations of its systematic basis. Abraham 
is correct in perceiving the inadequacy of existing theories, but his proposal does not go 
beyond either the classical evangelical or liberal models already in existence. 
'For an introduction to  the many theories p r o d u d  throughout the history of 
Christian theology see Avery Robert Ddes ,  Redation Theology: A History (Herder and 
Herder, NY: 1969); James Tunstead Burtchaell, Catholic Beories of Biblical Inspiration 
since 1810: A Rmkw and Critique (Cambridge, Engl.: Cambridge University Press, 1969); 
James I. Packer, "Contemporary Views of Revelation," in Redation and the Bible: 
Contemporary Evangelical Bought, ed. Carl F .  H. Henry (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1958); 
Peter Maarten Van Bemmelen, Issues in Biblical Inspiration: Sunday and Warfeld (Berrien 
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about the necessity of a new approach, an analysis of the models already 
in existence is required. In this article my purpose is to provide an 
epistemological description of the classical model of revelation- 
inspiration. The liberal model will be explored subsequently in another 
article. 
1. Theological Models 
At the outset, a word is in order regarding the nature of models 
considered as technical tools for the analysis and comparison of ideas. 
Models, says Ian Barbour, are "imagined mental constructs invented to 
account for observed phenomena"; they are used "to develop a theory 
which in some sense explains the phen~mena."~ Avery Dulles and David 
Tracy not only have worked very effectively with theological models 
but also have clarified what these are. Models, explains Dulles, attempt 
to uncover "structural features of systems," and are ideal, simplified, and 
schematic accounts of a much more complex real it^.^ Tracy explains 
that "a widely accepted dictum in contemporary theology is the need 
to develop certain basic models or types for understanding the specific 
task of the contemporary the~logian."~ In theology, the essence of 
models-that which makes their usage worthwhile-consists in showing 
the structural articulation of the main components involved in the 
interpretation of any given doctrine.' Thus, models are useful tools that 
help to identify the general characteristics of any theological position, 
school, or trend. 
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987); Rent5 Latourelle, Theology of Revelation. 
I d d i n g  a Commentary on the Constitution "Dei w h m  "of Vatican 11 (Staten Island, NY: 
Alba, 1966)) 87-309, Abraham, 111-113; Avery Robert Dulles, Models of R d a t i o n  
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1992)) 21; Robert Karl Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible: Theories 
ofInspiration, Revelation, and the Canon of Smipture (New York: Paullst Press, 19851, 6-62; 
and Bruce Vawter, Biblical Inspiration (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1972). 
'Ian G.  Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms (New York: Harper & Row, 
1974), 300. 
'Ddes, Models, 25, 30. 
6David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order The New Pluralism in Theology (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 22. For further literature on models, see, e.g., Frederick 
Fe&, Lmzguage, Logic and God (New Yo& Harper, 1961); Ian Ramsey, Modds and 
Mystery (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); and id., Christian Discourse (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965). 
'Tracy, 23. 
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Models have their limitations, however. For instance, they do 
not "provide an exact description of particular historical phen~mena."~ 
And furthermore, their truth status cannot be p r ~ v e d . ~  No particular 
theologian, therefore, will fit exactly the type or model that he or she 
represents.'' Moreover, some theologians are very difficult to classify as 
representing any given model; others even mix components that belong 
to several models." 
It is extremely important to distinguish properly between 
"system," "paradigm," and "model" so as to give precision to the 
analysis and avoid unnecessary confusion. "System" refers to the 
undergirding presuppositional structure that I explored in my second 
article." "Paradigm" refers to the methodology that any discipline needs 
in order to function properly as a science.13 Finally, the concept of 
model refers to the specific way in which a theological doctrine is 
articulated in its essential features. Thus, any particular model 
necessarily presupposes a scientific paradigm and a philosophical system. 
Since there are various ways in which both the presuppositional 
philosophical system and the scientific methodological paradigm can be 
interpreted, models for theological doctrines can also be conceived in 
sundry ways." For instance, Robert Gnuse speaks about strict verbal, 
Ibid. 
'Ddes, Models, 29. 
"Ibid., 29. 
'%anale, "Method," 190-192. 
"Thomas S. Kuhn has called attention to the term "pa&mn by it as a 
tool to  help him interpret the historical development of factual sciences. According to 
Kuhn, paradigm "stands for the entire consteUation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so 
on shared by the members of a given community" (Be  Structure of Scientz$c RevoIutions, 
2d ed. [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 19701, 175). Hans Kiing applied 
Kuhn's idea of parad;gm to the study of theological development (Beology for the B i rd  
MiZIennium: An Ecumenical Vim, trans. Peter Heinegg [New York Doubleday, 19881, 
123-226). See also Hans Kiing, "Paradigm Change in Theology: A Proposal for 
Discussion," in Paradigm Change in 7beology: A Sympiumfor the Future, ed. Hans Kiing 
and David Tracy, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 3-33. 
Unfortunately, the concept of parad;gm as used by both Kuhn and Kiing does not 
properly distinguish between the philosophical foundations of the sciences and their 
methodological structure. In other words, no distinction is made between system and 
pararb%m. 
14Dulles, Models, 26-27. 
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limited verbal, non-textual, and social theories of inspiration,15 whereas 
Carl Henry refers to evangelical, liberal, and neo-orthodox approaches.16 
Speaking specifically about revelation rather than inspiration, Dulles 
distinguishes five different models: doctrinal, historical, experiential, 
dialectical presence, and new awareness." Also speaking about 
revelation, Miikka Ruokanen notes three models: propositional, non- 
propositional, and non-propositional with new divinely originated 
information;18 he also discerns two models of inspiration, namely, the 
direct-instrumental and the integrated-content theories. As a final 
example, we may note that Abraham recognizes four models of 
inspiration: dictation, natural intuition, illumination of human natural 
powers, and dynamic control of the free human agent by the Holy 
S~ i r i t . ' ~  
In the task of identifying the most dominant models of 
revelation-inspiration produced throughout the history of Christian 
thought and of presenting a broad description of my suggested new 
model, I will use as analytical tools the methodology discussed in my 
second article and the interpretations of the ground (the 
presuppositional structure or system) presented in my first article. 
A model of inspiration-revelation should provide as clear an 
explanation as possible of the issue at hand; namely, the epistemological 
origin of Scripture. Specifically, it should supply an understanding of 
the way in which God and man interacted in the construction of 
meaning and information; or in other words, how they originated the 
total content of Scripture. It should also supply an understanding of the 
process of putting that content into the form of a written text. The 
description of a theological model, then, includes the following: first, an 
examination of the presuppositions of the underlying philosophical 
system; second, an analysis of revelation as the epistemological origin of 
the content of Scripture; third, an examination of the linguistic process 
of inscripturization; and fourth, an evaluation of the results when 
applied to Scripture as the source of theological data. 
"Gnuse, 22-23, 34-41, 42-49, and 50-68, respectively. 
War1 Henry, "Divine Revelation and the Bible," in Inspiration and Intevp~etation, 
ed. John Walvoord (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1957), 256-269. 
17Dulles, Models, 27-28. 
'%4& Ruokanen, Doctrina Divinitus Inspiata: Martin Luther's Position in the 
Ectrmenical Problem of Biblical Inspiration (Helsinki: Luther-Agncola Society, 1985), 19-23. 
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2. Presuppositional Structure of the Classical Model 
The presuppositional structure of the classical model encompasses the 
general metaphysical and epistemological principles of Greek philosophy as 
developed by Plato and Aristotle and adapted to Christianity by Augustine 
and Aquinas? Concretely, it includes metaphysically the principle of 
rea1ism:l and epistemologically the principle of "illumination" (Augustine's 
termino1ogy)u or "intellectualism" (the Aristotelian-Thomistic expres~ion).~~ 
Moreover, reality is conceived not only as independent from the cognitive 
subject, but also as timeless in nature.24 
'"I am aware that this is a simplification and generalization of a much more 
complex historical development. Such simplification and 'gene&tion is required here, 
however, by my purpose of outlining the main features of a model, in this case the 
classical model. 
''Aquinas' position differs from idealism, transcendentalism, and materialistic 
realism. In it the basic characteristic of reality is changelessness, which is at the center of 
the reality of things in what is called the second ousia. Johannes Hirschberger explaim 
that in addition to concrete reality (first ousia), "St. Thomas recognized second substance, 
which denotes that which in many individual ttungs is found to be identical, the common 
nature (natura communis). This coincides with the species or genus. St. Thomas prefers, 
however, to call it essence or quiddity (essentia, quidditas)" (The History of Philosophy, 2 
vols., trans. Anthony N. Fuerst Wwaukee, WI.: Bruce, 1958-19591, 1:417). Here again 
Aq& "is entirely at one with Aristotle, and by this theory, he along with Aristode 
makes it possible for a portion of Platonism to continue to live on" (ibid.). 
Wirschberger presents three main ways in which Augusthe's illumination has 
been understood (1:3 16-3 17). It is interesting to notice that Aquinas considered Augustine's 
position as compatible with his more elaborate intellectualism (Summa Theologica, 1.84.5). 
See also Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New Y ork Random, 1962)) 10-12. 
=In InteUectuaLsm, knowledge of reality is produced by the "agent intellect" 
(intellectus agens). The agent, which is located in the timeless soul, has the capability to  
abstract the timeless essence (second ousia) from the concrete reality in which it is given 
to us (first ousia). All human knowledge is structured this way. Sensory perception is 
considered to  be the start;ng point of knowledge, but is always of the timeless essence, 
never the temporal historical reality. For an introduction to Aquinas' intellectualism, see 
Hirschberger, 1:435-439; G d e r m o  F d e ,  Historia de la FiIosofa, 3 vols. (Madrid: B.A.C., 
1965-1966)) 2:979-1005; and Norman L. Geisler, Thomas A q u i m  An Evangelical Appraisal 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1991), 86-90. For an introduction to intellectualism as a general 
epistemological theory of knowledge, see Johannes Hessen, Teovrb del Comcimiento, 9th 
ed. (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1969)) 61-64. 
"In the classical system, timeless (ultimate) reality is conceived to be analogical. 
Consequently, the characteristic of timelessness pertains properly to God, and only in 
various degrees of analogy to the rest of reality. See my A Criticism of Theological Reason: 
Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews 
University Press, 1983), 185, n. 1. Aquinas put it in the following way: "Eternity, in the 
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In this model, divine activity belongs to a world of timelessness; 
divine and human knowledge, likewise, pertain to the same world of 
timelessness. Even when the intellect is "active" in abstracting or seeing 
the independent timeless reality that is given to it within the concrete 
temporal reality, it nonetheless is passive in regard to the content of the 
knowledge that it achieves. Intellectualism (and much more so 
Augustine's "illumination") conceives of knowledge as basically caused 
by the presupposed timeless reality or essence that determines the 
scientific content formed in the human mind. The classical model of the 
origin of Scripture, built on the basis of this philosophical structure, was 
already generally accepted during the patristic period:5 and is shared by 
both conservative Roman Catholic and Protestant  tradition^.^^ 
3. Revelation in the Classical Model 
As indicated above, the process of revelation has two 
components: divine activity and human activity. At this juncture, we 
must consider their function and use within the "classical model" and 
what constitutes their essence and content in this model. 
true and proper sense, belongs to God done,, for eternity, we said, follows upon 
unchangeableness (immutabrlitatem) " (Summa theologica, 1.10.3), and eternity is timeless 
(Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 1.15.3; Summu theohgica, 1.10.2 ad 3; 1.10.4; 1.10.4 ad 
2 and 3; 1.10.3; 1.10.1). For a commentary on Augusthe's timeless conception of God, 
see William Thomas Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 5 vols., 2d ed. (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969-1975), 2:88-93. 
Vawter remarks that the Fathers' view of Scripture was influenced not only by 
the Hellenistic culture but also by Palestinian Judaism, which had already assimilated 
Greek culture (35-36). He concludes that "the fact remains that it was among men with 
very lide of the Biblical sense of historical religion that the Church's doctrine of 
inspiration was destined to be discussedw (3 6). About two centuries earlier than Augusthe, 
Origen appears to have shared the classical view. Accord;ng to Enrique N d o n i ,  Origen 
believed that revelation (he called it "divine illumination") "operates in a double way. On 
the one hand, it energizes the n a d  faculties of the prophets" ("Origen's Concept of 
Biblical Inspiration," B e  Second Century 4 [1984]: 14). "On the other hand, it operates by 
offering an apprehensible aspect of the divine mysteryn (15). 
261bid., 76. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the spec& views of 
sbenth-century Protestant Reformers, a topic which would require a complete study in 
its own right. I should point out, however, that Ruokanen's volume about Luther (see n. 
19, above) is instructive on the subject. In this article, the Protestant tradition will be 
represented by the views of certain present-day conservative Christian scholars, especially 
Carl F. H. Henry. 
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Divine Activity 
The concept of revelation as the origin of biblical content 
developed slowly. Thomas Aquinas' synthesis brought to technical 
expression the basic trend of classical tho~ght.~' For him, revelation was 
the result of God's action on the human intellect, by which God might 
"disclose new ideas or species to the mind of the prophet by direct 
action upon the senses, the imagination, or by reordering existing ideas 
or species in an original way, or by direct action upon the intellect."2s 
In other words, revelation "is normally communicated to the prophet 
by the supernatural gift of representations (sensible, imaginative, or 
intelligible), accompanied by an illumination of the judgment enabling 
the mind to understand and exploit them."29 
Thus, revelation requires two actions of God upon the prophet 
or writer. First, he has to generate the content; and second, he has to 
enable the prophet to think (judge) at higher-than-natural level of reason 
demanded by the supernatural content itself." Such enabling, when 
given to the active intellect, does not destroy it, but rather elevates it.31 
Degrees of revelation are recognized, however, since some of the 
means through which God reveals his transcendent truth are more 
effective and excellent than others.32 This, in turn, leads proponents of 
this model to the conclusion that most of the Bible's contents have 
originated, not from supernatural revelation, but rather from the human 
=J. T. Forestell, "Bible, I1 (Inspiration)," New Cdtholic Encyclopedia (1967-1989)) 
2:384. See also John ScuKon, The i%eology of Inspiration (Notre Dame, IN.: Fides, 1970)) 
36. For an indepth study on Aquinas' doctrine of revelation, see Paul Synave and Pierre 
Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiratiow A Commentary on the Summa Theologica XI-II, Questions 
171-178", trans. Avery Ddes (New York Desclee, 1961); Pierre Benoit, Aspects of Biblical 
Inspiration, trans. J. Murphy-O'Connor and S. K. Ashe (Chicago Priory, 1965)) 44-64. 
According to Charles Joseph Cpstello, Augusthe conceived that truths were 
communicated to the prophets "either through their sense faculties, or directly through 
the intellect" (St. Augustine's Doctrine on the Ikpiration and Gzmnicity of Scrapture 
[Washmgton, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 19301, 11). See also Vawter, 40. 
"Benoit, 44. 
''Aquinas, Summa theologica 2a-2ae, 171.1, ad 4. ScuKon points out that for 
Aquinas, this elevation of the mind was inspiration and that consequently "Thomas did 
not discuss scriptural inspiration as we understand it" (36). 
'Ibid., 2a-he, 171.2. 
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writers, whose active intellects were especially enabled or illuminated to 
judge properly the kind of things accessible to every person." 
Human Activity 
In the formation of the actual content of revealed truth, the 
classical model assigns to the human participant a passive, receptive role. 
Aquinas, again, states this characteristic with unmistakable clarity. Since 
revelation is an action of God directed to the prophet's intellect, it does 
not destroy that intellect; rather it elevates and utilizes it, so that the 
human involvement in revelation actually occurs within the prophet's 
intellectual fa~ulty.'~ It seems clear that at this point Aquinas' system or 
presuppositional structure takes over, for he views the intellectual 
activity of the human recipients as contributing nothing to the creation 
of the content of the revealed truths. These truths are caused only and 
totally by God, who in various ways and degrees impresses them on the 
minds of the prophets.35 In order to receive these truths, the prophets' 
intellectual capabilities are ontologically heightened by a supernatural 
act of God, as we have already noted. In fact, without such heightening, 
the normal intellect of the prophet would be unable to receive the 
supernatural, timeless truths that revelation conveys. 
l%e Essence or Nuttkre of Revelation 
By now the essence or nature of revelation according to the 
classical model has become apparent. Revelation is cognitive. As stated 
by Aquinas, "Prophecy first and chiefly consists in kn~wledge."'~ But 
although truth is timeless, it is given to human knowledge within 
concrete temporal realities that are initially processed through sensory 
perception. If in this life, natural truth is to be abstracted by the active 
intellect from the data provided by sensory perception, this process is 
"Ibid., 2a-2ae, 174, ad 3. Also see Benoit, 44. 
"ST, 2a-he, 173.2. See also n. 32, above. 
"Ibid., 1.79.2. The passive understandmg of man's activity in revelation was 
already present in Origen. Nardoni remarks that the communication involved in 
revelation "h made by 'a spiritual impression' on the spiritual sense of the prophet's mind. 
This impression stimulates the spiritual sense and determines the character of whatever 
the prophet has perceived" (15). 
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even more evident in the case of supernatural revelation, which is 
supposed to convey divine timeless truth. 
It should be observed, however, that inasmuch as sensory 
perception works on natural data provided by concrete realities existing 
in space and time, the intellect in its abstractive function is supposed to 
eliminate the historical aspects and to concentrate only on the timeless 
ones. The latter are conceived to be the immutable eternal truths 
revealed by God in either natural or supernatural revelation. 
The Content of Revelation 
According to the classical model, the specific content of the 
supernatural knowledge generated by God in the intellect of the 
prophets has been interpreted in various ways. Aquinas, for instance, 
considered that the content of revelation includes potentially the total 
sum of absolute truth as it eternally exists in God. In the divine 
intellect, he says, "originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its 
first cause,"37 and "the principle of things pertaining to supernatural 
knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God Himself."38 
Prophetic knowledge, under the form of teaching, is a likeness of the 
eternal timeless knowledge of the divine intellect. Thomas thus 
specifically isolates God as the actual content of revelation. 
Theology by definition, however, deals only with that part of 
eternal truth which is not accessible through sensory perception and the 
natural intellect. In other words, revelation is properly predicated of 
those aspects of divine knowledge that we cannot access through our 
natural reason (our sensory perception and active intellect), and 
theology deals with either natural or supernatural truths insofar as these 
relate to divine salvation. "It was necessary for the salvation of man, 
that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known 
to him by divine revelation," says Aquinas, who then goes on 
immediately to explain that it was also indispensable that truths which 
are necessary for salvation should be revealed by God. This is so, even 
when such truths may be accessible to human reason, for reason is able 
to discover truth about God only "after a long time, and with the 
admixture of many errors. "" 
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Thus, the content of revelation is knowledge about salvation, and 
this pertains to divine things that in their nature and in their fullest 
meaning are timeless. It would seem to follow, therefore, that not all 
parts of Scripture, having been written within a historical frame of 
thought, are relevant as sources for theology. And moreover, since 
supernature is defined as timeless by the presuppositiond structure, 
history cannot be in itself the content of revelation. It is, at best, 
revelation's vehicle in uia. 
In this context, it is important to notice that history is not 
considered by Aquinas as being even a means of revelation. He clearly 
summarizes his view about the means by which God conveys 
supernatural knowledge to the heightened intellect of the prophet by 
saying that "prophetic revelation takes place in four ways, namely, by 
the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible 
species, by impression or co-ordination of pictures in the imagination, 
and by the outward presentation of sensible images."40 Thus, actual 
history is not considered by Aquinas as a vehicle of revelation, much 
less as a source of it. 
John Henry Newman, agreeing with Aquinas' concept of 
theology as the supernatural science of salvation, and taking seriously 
the statements about the origin of Scripture made by Trent (1545-1563) 
and the first Vatican Council (1870), seriously maintained that the 
content of inspiration reached only things that pertained to "faith and 
moral conduct."41 This statement is broader than the more specific 
position by Aquinas. 
A variation within the classical model is presented by the more 
recent theory of propositional revelation championed by the 
conservative wing of American E~angelicalism.'~ Carl F. H. Henry 
stresses that God reveals himself verbally and hist~ricdly.'~ However, 
when speaking about the verbal and historical features of revelation, 
"'Ibid., 2a-2ae. 173.3; 2a-2ae.174.1. 
430hn Henry Newman, On the Inspiration of Scripture, ed. J. Derek Holmes and 
Robert Murray (Washington D.C.: Corpus, 1967), 108-109. For an overview of Newmanys 
thought and his idhence on Catholic thought, see J. D. Holmes and R. Murray, 
"Introduction," in ibid., 3-96. 
"The evangelical theory of propositional revelation belongs to the classical model 
because the presuppositional structure on which it stands is borrowed from classical 
catholic &ding.  
43God, R d d i o n  and Authoyity, 6 vols. (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976-1983), 
3:268-269,3:261-271,480. Henry spe&dy agrees with the classical reahm-inte11ectuahm 
of Augustine and Aqninas (ibid., 3: 168-169). 
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Henry refers to means rather than to content. Like Aquinas, Henry 
believes that the essence of revelation is cognitive. "Revelation in the 
Bible, " he declares, "is essentially a mental conception: God's disclosure 
is rational and intelligible communication. Issuing from the mind and 
will of God, revelation is addressed to the mind and will of human 
beings. n44 
For Henry, the content of revelation is God himself, especially 
his salvific purposes for humankind." This supernatural knowledge is 
given to human beings within human history through the means of 
nature, historical events, internal divine disclosure to conscience and 
reason (elements of general revelation), and Jesus Christ (the 
consummation of special revelation). 
When Henry speaks of the Logos, he views the historical Jesus 
of Nazareth as only the vehicle through which the eternal Logos, who 
is equal to God, is revealed to human knowledge. 
The central and unifying element in the biblical 
doctrine of the Logos of God is transcendent divine 
communication mediated by the eternal Christ. The word 
of God is personal and rational, and the truth of God, 
whether given in general or in special disclosure, 
including the climactic revelation of the Logos in Jesus of 
Nazareth, can be propositionally formulated. All divine 
revelation mediated to man is incarnational, inasmuch as 
it is given in human history, concepts and language." 
Henry's understanding of this "incarnational" or historical nature of 
revelation is further clarified by his remark that "justification by faith, 
or any other scripturally revealed truth, is historical revelation, in the 
sense that it was divinely revealed at a certain place and time."" 
It seems clear from the foregoing quotations that for Henry 
historicity does not belong either to the essence or to the content of 
what is being revealed, namely, supernatural divine truths. It should be 
added, however, that he, like Aquinas, believes that natural reason needs 
"Ibid., 3:248; see also 1:200. 
"Ibid., 2:321. 
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to be elevated in order for it to be able to receive these supernatural 
The Bible, says Henry, presents both natural and supernatural 
revealed truths. And once again, he sets forth his view in language that 
reminds us of Aquinas: 
Special scriptural revelation normatively sets forth 
the propositional content of general revelation, and does 
so as the framework of God's saving revelation. Scripture 
confronts fallen man objectively and externally with a 
divinely inspired literary deposit that states the intelligible 
components of God's ongoing general revelation in 
nature and history, and conveys as well the propositional 
content of God's redemptive re~elation."~~ 
Thus, for Henry, what the prophet receives from God through 
historical means is "cognitive truths" and these he puts into 
propositional form as Scripture is written. But biblical statements as a 
whole must not be identified with propositional revelation, for what 
Scripture contains is, rather, "a body of divinely given information 
actually expressed or capable of being expressed in  proposition^."^^ 
'%ee, e.g., ibid., 1:201, 3:171, and 4:119. 
501bid., 3:457. Henry is aware that the Bible presents a God who freely and 
actively intervenes in human history (ibid., 2:25 1). He is correct in af6rm;lg that Jesus' 
cross and resurrection must be understood as belonging to human spatio-temporal history 
(ibid., 2:289, 321). But, one may ask, how can an eternal (timeless) transcendent being act 
in history and time? According to Henry "the answer given by biblical theism is that God 
acts by predestination" (ibid., 648). But, one should not forget that within the content 
of Henry's theological tradition predestination involves "more than simply a temporal and 
historical election" (ibid., 678); "what the Bible afEirms is God's pretemporal, 
superhistorid eternal election" (ibid.). In other words, the existence of the universe is 
grounded "on the eternal plan of the unchanging God who is free to decree as he pleases 
and who in his 'good pleasure' decrees a space-time matrix that by his willing becomes as 
necessary as God himself" (ibid.). Moreover, since "God's decree is preceded l o g i d y  by 
his intrinsic self knowledge, unless it be the case that his decree and his self-knowledge are 
identical or that the decree is part of his self-knowledge" (ibid.), and since "the external 
universe is itself God's implementation of his purpose" (ibid.), it follows that Henry agrees 
with Plato's basic ontologid structure accord;ng to which historical re+ is the 
temporal duplication of the eternal one. The order of divine causes and activities, then, 
are not performed from within the temporal order but rather from the timeless one. 
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Thus, Henry's thesis attempts to integrate the historical activity 
of God and the historical Jesus Christ as presented in Scripture with the 
theoretical structure of the classical model of revelation. As a result, 
Jesus Christ is called to play a central role, but only as a means of 
making eternal truth accessible to human cognitive limitations. Since 
Henry shares the classical presuppositional structure, the full force of 
the biblical conception of reality is still shackled in his system. 
Ronald Nash holds a more moderate view of propositional 
revelation, since he recognizes that "some revelation is propositional, that 
some revelation conveys cognitive information." Moreover, he also 
points out that "some revelation is personal and noncognitive." Nash, 
then, appears as an example of a theologian who mixes views belonging 
to two main models, namely, the classical and the liberal (the latter of 
these, as will be seen in my next article, emphasizes a non-cognitive 
personal ground for re~elation).~' 
4. Inspiration in  the Classical Model 
The interpretation of revelation-the way in which the contents 
of Scripture are espistemologically originated-is not enough to explain 
the origin of Scripture. The linguistic process of writing, or 
inscripturization, must also be addressed. Consequently, the classical 
m ~ d e l  developed, besides a doctrine of revelation, an interpretation of 
inspiration. 
An analysis of the classical model of inspiration requires at least 
three procedures. These are, first, the examination of the specific divine 
and human involvement in the process of inscripturization," second, the 
characterization of the essence of such a process; and finally, a brief 
mention of the main theoretical variations regarding the content and 
scope of inspiration. 
The Role of Divine Activity in  Inspiration 
The classical model of revelation-inspiration has interpreted 
God's involvement in the writing of Scriptures by following one of 
three possible patterns, namely, dictation, primary causality, and 
creation-providence. 
"Ronald Nash, "Southern Baptists and the Notion of Revealed Truth," CrisweZl 
7%eological Review 2 (1988): 376-377. 
''See, e.g., Newman, 115, and Abraham, 2. 
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The dictation pattern has been advocated since early in the 
history of Christian theology." According to this pattern, God is the 
writer of the entire Bible, which "is deposited ready-made in the mind 
of the human writer."54 The latter needs "only understand the words 
materially and be able to write them correctly, nothing more."55 Very 
few theologians, however, seem to have understood God's involvement 
in the writing of Scripture in this extreme form of mechanical 
d i~ ta t ion .~~  
The primary-causality pattern takes inspiration to be a divine 
action ad extra, with Aquinas as its classical exponent. It views God's 
action of inspiration as a supernatural charismatic gift by means of 
which the "Holy Spirit moves and elevates the faculties of the sacred 
writers of the Bible."57 AS a consequence, the Bible "is ascribed to God 
the principal author and man the secondary or instrumental author."" 
The precise theological explanation of God as the principal author is 
made by way of "the philosophical principles of instrumental 
~ausali ty,"~~ and this primary-secondary cause pattern involves a sort of 
coordination between God as the primary agent and the prophet as his 
in~trument.~' In the writing of Scripture, the human instrument "does 
5JFor a good historical survey of advocates of the dictation pattern, see Luis 
Alomo Schokel, B e  Inspired Work.. Smpture in the Light of Language a d  Literature, tram;. 
Francis Ma& (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), 66-72. 
nJohn Barton, "Verbal Inspiration," A Dictionary of Biblical Intevpvetution, 
Philadelphia: Trinity Press International (1 990), 720. 
56Within the Roman Catholic tradition, notable proponents of mechanical 
dictation are Dominic BaGez, C. R. Bhar t ;  within the Protestant tradition, the Fownula 
Consensus Hdvetica, Johann G e r h d ,  and Quemtedt (see Schokel, 68-69). However, 
accord;ng to Forestell, "no one today would hold that God dictated the words of 
Scripture in an audible manner to the ear of the sacred writer" (2:384). 
57Charles H. Pickar, "The Bible," in B e  Summa l%eologica, 3 vols., by Thomas 
Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York, NY: Benzinger, 
1948), 3:3105. 
qorestell explains in less technical terms the concept of instrumentality: "an 
instrument, such as a saw or a trumpet, cannot produce any effect unless it is used by a 
carpenter or a musician. When so used, it produces an effect proper to  its own nature; a 
saw is designed to cut wood, a trumpet to  make music. The effect, however, surpasses the 
proper causality of the instrument even though the latter receives and conditions the 
action of the principal agent" (2:383-384). 
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not act on his own, but in virtue of an action communicated to it by 
the principal agent."61 
In this model, the prophet is God's passive instrument, not only 
"in regard to the internal mental conception of the writing, but in 
regard also to the literary form and external expression of the book."" 
But even though this pattern emphasizes God's authorship of Scripture, 
the notion of human instrumentality may account for the existence of 
biblical imperfections. This pattern thus has room for certain 
imperfections, including literary defects, because they "are not ascribed 
to God, but to the human authors of S~ripture."~~ The imperfections 
and literary defects are caused by the limits proper to the essence of the 
human instrument. The foregoing pattern has been officially adopted by 
the Roman Catholic church.(" 
The providence pattern is utilized to explain God's activity in 
the writing of Scripture as a specific case of his sovereign providential 
government of the world. On the basis of this pattern, modern 
Evangelicalism rejects the mechanical dictation pattern of divine action 
in inspiration." Millard Erickson states that even in what B. B. Warfield 
regarded as the most diluted form of Calvinism, it is possible to 
621bid., 3:3107 and 3105. Also Aquinas, Strmm thedogica, 2a-2ae, 173.4; 3.62.2 ad 1. 
&In its third session (April 24, 1870), the First Vatican Cound promulgated the 
"Dogmatic Constitution concerning the Catholic Faith," which, in its second chapter 
states that the Roman Catholic church holds the Bible "not because, having been put 
together by human industry alone, they were then approved by its authority; nor because 
they contain revelation without error; but because, having been written by the inspiration 
of the Holy Spirit, they have God as their author and, as such, they have been handed 
down to the Church itself" (Henry Denzinger, 7he Sources of Cathdic Dogma, trans. Roy 
J. Deferran, from the 30th ed. of Denzinger's Enchiridion Symbolorurn [St. Lo&, MO: 
Herder, 19571, 1787). On November 18, 1965, the Second Vatican Cound promulgated 
its "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," which, upholding the traditional view 
of Trent and other authorities, states that "in composing the sacred books, God chose men 
and while employed by Him they made use of their powers and abilities, so that with 
Him acting in them and through them, they, as true authors, consigned to writkg 
everything and only those dungs which He wanted." Therefore, "since everything asserted 
by the inspired authors or sacred writers must be held to be asserted by the Holy Spirit, 
it follows that the books of Scripture must be acknowledged as teaching firmly, faithfully, 
and without error that truth which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake 
of our salvation" (Walter M. Abbott, ed. 7he Donrments of Vatican 11, trans. and ed. 
Joseph Gallagher [New Yo& G d d ,  19661, Dei Vmhm, 3: 11). 
%ee Abraham, 4. 
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maintain that God became the author of Scripture by carefully 
"directing the thought of the writers, so that they were precisely the 
thoughts that he wished expressed."" According to this view, which 
Erickson shares, God renders certain, but not necessary, the outcome 
of any free action by determining the external circumstances that 
influence them." Kenneth S. Kantzer points out that Calvin's view of 
divine activity in inspiration does not make the prophet "an instrument 
which simply passes on words mechanically given to him. Rather, 
because of God's sovereign control of his being, he is an instrument 
whose whole personality expresses itself naturally to write exactly the 
words God wishes to speak. Only in this large and comprehensive sense 
are the words of Scripture dictated by God."68 
i%e Role of Human Activity in Inspiration 
In the classical model, human contributions are kept to the 
minimal possible level. Not only in the origination of truth but in the 
very writing of Scripture, God is the main, or principal, overshadowing 
cause or author.69 The activity of the Holy Spirit is experienced by the 
writer as a gift that heightens the natural capabilities and transforms the 
prophet into a suitable instrument for the specific activity of writing 
Scripture.'O Most classical thinking allowed no active role or specific 
contribution on the part of the human element in the instrument. This 
human agent was conceived essentially as a passive tool, used by the 
Holy Spirit in the historical process of writing Scripture." The passivity 
of the human instrument refers to the total dependence of the human 
66Millard J. Erickson, Christian 'Iheology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 216, 
359. 
Ybid., 357-359. 
%erne& S. Kantzer, "Cdvh and the Holy Scriptures," in Inspiration and 
Intevpretution, ed. John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1957), 141. 
@For a study of human involvement in inspiration written from within the 
conservative Evangelical tradition, see Gordon R. Lewis, "The Human Authorship of 
Inspired Scripture," in Inewancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1980), 229-264. 
70See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa theologica, 2a-2ae, 174.2 ad 3. Cf. Eugene F. Klug, 
"Revelation and Inspiration in Contemporary Roman Catholic Theology," B e  
Sp.n&elder 26 (1962): 17-18. 
71See Barton, 720; also Abraham, 3. 
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agent on the divine cause, entailing no material absence of human 
activity in the actual process of writing. 
There is, however, a track of classical thinking that allows 
human activity a small amount of room in the formation of the sacred 
text, such as in gathering material and conceiving the literary plan of 
the book." Of course, even these tasks are viewed as being performed 
under the direct influence of the Holy Spirit, a matter that I have 
already explained. The passive nature of the human role in the process 
of inspiration is, in fact, a basic feature in all subvarieties of the classical 
model of revelation-inspiration. 
The Essence of Inspiration 
The essence of inspiration is difficult to identify. In general 
terms, however, I would suggest that inspiration is the connection that 
occurs between God's power, will, and knowledge, and man's limited 
cognitive, volitive, and literary capabilities in order to produce a verbal 
or written account of divine revelation. "Inspiration is a supernatural 
influence upon divinely chosen prophets and apostles," declares Henry, 
"whereby the Spirit of God assures the truth and trustworthiness of the 
oral and written pr~clarnation."~~ 
On this ontological basis, the relationship between divine and 
human activities in the writing of Scripture is described, for instance, as 
"concursive," "simultaneous," "confluent," and/or "harmonious. "74 
RSee Costello on Augusthe's remarks on the human activity of man (220-222). 
Costello, however, clarXes that Augustine tended to emphasize either the divine or the 
human activities without providing proper ways to put both concepts together in a 
harmonious theological theory (18), and he portrays Augusthe as affhmhg that God wills 
the order of the book. This, then, transforms the activity affirmed for the human agent 
into something superfluous. According to Schokel, Roman Catholic theological manuals 
(it seems he is speaking of late theological developments in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries) move further away from even Augustine's most generous statements r e g a h  
man's activity. These manuals affirm, e.g., that the process of writing Scripture was "not 
under a special supernatural influence" but was "carried out with the aid of a certain 
divine assistance which guarantees that the terms are apt and that there is no error. This 
assistance does not consist in a physical motion a+ directly on the executive faculties" 
(180). Though leaning somewhat towards the classical model of revelation, this relatively 
recent development seems to be a clear departure from the essentials of the classical model 
of inspiration. 
"Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 4: 129. 
74Various of these terms are used interchangeably by evangelical scholars, but 
"concursive" is often identified with J. I. Packer, who says, "We are to think of the 
Spirit's inspiring activity, and, for that matter, of all  His regular operations in and upon 
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Defining the essence of inspiration in terms of such concepts eliminates 
dictation, thus allowing room for consciousness and freedom on the 
part of the writer. However, the classical understanding of the essence 
of inspiration is unable to overcome two fundamental shortcomings: 
first, that God as author and primary cause in the production of 
Scripture reduces the human contribution to its minimal possible 
expression; and second, that the relationship between divine and human 
activities occurs in a more-or-less mechanical and non-personal mode. 
7he Content of Inspirution 
It should not surprise us that there are many and subtle 
variations of opinion regarding the actual content of inspiration. In 
general, however, it is possible to identify interpreters as following one 
or the other of two main patterns. Some affirm inspiration for the 
totality of Scripture while others limit the scope of inspiration to some 
portions of Scripture. The first pattern, affirming full plenary verbal 
inspiration, is espoused by persons who tend to explain the 
epistemological origin of Scripture by way of a theory of inspiration. 
The second pattern, affirming limited verbal inspiration, is advocated by 
persons who are inclined to connect inspiration with the classical model 
of revelation. 
It should also be noted that both the dictation and the plenary- 
verbal theories of inspiration affirm that inspiration reaches the totality 
of Scripture. They differ in the interpretation of the way in which the 
divine activity in inspiration is conceived. The former supports 
dictation, and the later adopts either the primary-cause or the sovereign- 
providence   at tern.'^ 
human personality, as (to use an old but valuable technical term) concursive; that is, as 
exercised in, through and by means of the writer's own activiv, in such a way that their 
t.hding and writing was both free and spontaneous on their part and divinely elicited and 
controlled, and what they wrote was not only their own work but also God's work" 
("Fundamentalism " and the Word of God: Some Evangelical Pritt~~pIes [Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 19581, 80); Costello, 18; and Randall Basinger and David Basinger, "Inerrancy, 
Dictation and the Free WiU Defence," EQ 55 (1983): 178. Regarding the meaning and 
significance of the various terms, see &o R. A. Finlayson, "Contempomry Ideas of 
Inspiration," in Redation and the Bi& Contemporav Evangelical Thought, ed. by Carl 
F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids, MI.: Baker, 1958), 223. 
75For an introduction to the dictation theory, see Vaivter, 59-61; Forestell, 385; 
Klug, 15; Kantzer, 137-139; Gnuse, 49; Abraham, 116; Packer, 95; Barton, 721; and 
Costello, 12-16. Regarding the Verbal Plenary theory, see Gnuse, 10-11, 27; Klug, 14, 16; 
Newman, 150; Kern R. Trembath, Evangelical l%eories of Biblical itupiration. A Review 
and Proposal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8-27; Barton, 720-722; Nash, 381; 
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5. Implications for Theology 
The interpretation of revelation-inspiration is not inconsequential 
for the development and constitution of Christian theology. On the 
contrary, after it is theologically formulated, the interpretation of the 
revelation-inspiration doctrine plays the foundational role of being the 
epistemological presupposition that defines the scope and nature of 
Scripture as theological data. But in what way does the classical model 
determine the scope and nature of the biblical writings as theological 
data? On this question, there appear to be two views. One emphasizes 
the process of writing (inspiration), and the other emphasizes the 
process by which supernatural ideas are originated in the mind of the 
prophet (revelation). 
When the epistemological origin of Scripture is primarily 
understood in reference to the writing process, the full verbal plenary 
theory of inspiration affirms the whole Scripture to be the word of God 
at face value. Consequently, all the words of the Bible are equally 
considered as supernatural revelation from the timeless and changeless 
God." The entire scope of Scripture is inerrant supernatural revelation, 
not only in its spiritual or doctrinal-salvific content, but in every 
historical detail. Gnuse puts it this way: 
The words of Scripture may be considered absolute 
truth and used without fear for the articulation of 
theology and Church practice. The treatment of textual 
statements in this fashion implies that the text is 
propositional revelation from God to man. For if God is 
truthful, and Scripture is revealed by God, then it must 
be true in all its parts. If God is perfect, and God is 
revealed in the Bible, the Bible must be perfect. Since not 
lying entails total and absolute accuracy, and common 
sense tells us that the accuracy is the same for all people 
- -- -- - 
and Henry, "Divine Revelation," 257. For information on the limited verbal inspiration 
approach, see, e.g., Gnuse, 34-41; Scullion, 27-28; Finlayson, 223-224; Ruokanen, 9-17,33, 
35-36; 72-74; 115; Costello, 27; and Ddes, Models, 41. 
'%ee Gnuse, 23, and Forestell, 386. The latter points out that "in the 20th 
century, apart from some fundameadst sects, the doctrine of Biblid inerrancy is 
abandoned because of modem Biblical criticism. Where inspiration is still 
mentioned, no attempt is made to explain its nature or its effects." 
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everywhere, then Scripture must be accurate in all its 
details.77 
Thus, Scripture in its entirety qualifies as a source of theological 
data. The nature of Scripture in this role, however, is determined by the 
timeless omnipotence of God, who through the Holy Spirit 
overshadows the human agency and overrides all human limitations, 
errors, and sins. Consequently, in this view of divine inspiration, 
Scripture is viewed as having divine objectivity, perfection, accuracy, 
and inerrancy. The approach is structurally flawed, of course, in that it 
is doubtful that a proper account of the epistemological origin of 
Scripture can be rendered without direct and explicit reference to the 
origination of ideas and information." 
When the epistemological origin of Scripture is primarily 
understood in reference to the cognitive process by which supernatural 
ideas were originated in the minds of the biblical writers, Scripture is 
conceived to include both supernatural and natural contents (limited 
verbal inspiration)." Timeless truths are incarnated in temporal human 
words.'O The whole of Scripture is inspired:' but only part of it is 
re~ealed.'~ Revelation is that intellectual timeless truth that God reveals 
to the charismatically empowered reason of the prophet, who, with the 
additional supernatural assistance of inspiration, consigns such truth into 
verbal or written form. In this view, only those portions of Scripture 
that are at the same time revealed and inspired are considered proper 
78Rega& the need to integrate the accounts of revelation and inspiration in any 
model that may properly set forth the epistemological origin of Scriptures, see, e.g., 
Finlayson, 223-224. 
"Limited verbal inspiration is the position traditionally maintained by the Roman 
Catholic Church: Trent (1546) (Denzinger, 783)) the First Vatican Council (1870) 
(Denzinger, 1787)) and the Second Vatican Council (1965) (Dogmatic Constitution on 
Divine ReveIation," 2: 11, in The Documents of Vatican II,118-119). See &o Newman, 150- 
151. 
80"Histonc Evangelical Christianity considers the Bible as  the essential textbook 
because, in view of this quality [inspiration], it inscripturates divinely revealed truth in 
verbal form" (Henry, God, R d a t i o n  and Authovity, 4:129). See also Schokel, 87. 
""No distinction of inspiration exists between parts of the Bible. All are inspired, 
dthough not for the same immediate purposes" (Henry, "Divine Revelation," 257). 
82S~mma theologica, 2a-2ae, 173.2; KZug, 16; Scullion, 40; Schokel, 55; Forestell, 
384. 
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sources of the~logy.~' Unfortunately, due to the historical constitution 
of biblical thinking, this view, as Scullion points out, recognizes that 
"precious little, of what a writer records has been revealed to him, much 
is of purely human origin." And thus, revealed supernatural teaching 
"will not be expressed in every sentence the sacred author writes. 
Indeed, the greater part of what he writes will not be revelation in the 
strict sense at all." The "idea, the judgment, the doctrine, that God 
wishes to convey will emerge from a thousand phrases of minimal 
importance. And it is this that merits their being considered revelation 
in the broad sense."84 
One important epistemological-methodological consequence of 
doing theology under the second view in the classical model of 
revelation and inspiration, then, is that a very reduced portion of 
Scripture qualifies as the source for theological reflection. Thus, the sola 
Sniptura principle, if maintained, cannot be qualified by the tota 
Scriptura principle, and a "canon within the canon" is necessary to 
determine which specific portions of Scriptures can play the role of 
sources for theology. The selection will be determined, of course, by the 
actual content of the specific concepts that each classical-model tradition 
happens to choose as central for the constitution and defense of the 
doctrinal convictions of the community. 
6. Conclusion 
The question about whether the formulation of a new model for 
the explanation of the epistemological origin of Scripture is necessary 
requires, as a first step, the exploration of existing, generally accepted 
models. In this article I have described from an epistemological 
"Aquinas opens his S~mma Theologica by clearly stating that "it was necessary 
for the salvation of man that ce& truths which exceed human reason should be made 
known to him by divine revelation," and he closes his &st article by concluding that "it 
was therefore necessary that, besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should 
be a sacred science learned through revelation" (1.1). Even though Augusthe believed in 
verbal inspiration so as to state that "these sacred books, are the works of God's way in 
leadmg the believer to the understanding of eternal truths. We must study 
"Scriptures-explained Augustine-, which adapt themselves to the backwardness of 
infants, whom they nou&h in the first place by humble belief in the historical deeds 
accomplished in the temporal order for our salvation, and subsequently strengthen in 
order to lift them up to the sublime understanding of things eternal" (ibid.). 
Consequently, "a man who is resting upon faith, hope and love, and who keeps a fuln 
hold upon these, does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of instructing 
others" (On Christian Doctrine, 1.39.43). 
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perspective the broad characteristics of the classical model. The 
epistemological description of the liberal model of revelation-inspiration 
and the evaluation of both the Classical and Liberal models will be 
treated in my next article. 
